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The rebels' credibility dilemma: A new approach to the search for credibility
towards the international community and the population
Abstract
By being part into the theory of the rebels' credibility dilemma, this research takes its framework in a
historical analysis of relations between rebel groups and governments, in order to better understand the
mechanisms of demands and negotiations between these two actors. In this paper, we propose to test
the validity of the theory of the rebels' credibility dilemma in Latin America, and to provide specific
precision to this geographical area. For that, our approach proposes an historical and political study on
data going from 1945 to 2019. The study is characterized by the creation of specific classifications and a
relative power indicator of the rebel groups, making it possible to highlight new specificities of the rebels'
credibility dilemma. The results show that globally the theory seems valid on the studied area, but that
new parameters can be implemented to the initial theory, namely the search for popular and international
credibility, through a general model of the rebels’ credibility dilemma.
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The Rebels’ Credibility Dilemma: A New Approach to the Search for Credibility
Towards the International Community and the Population
Theò Bajon
The study of rebel groups, and more particularly the relationship between the dyad formed by
rebel groups and governments, is a key scientific issue in conflict management and the promotion
of peace around the world (Nilsson, 2010). In recent years, this field of research has benefited from
many studies that gradually makes it possible to better identify the various issues of this problem
while developing different approaches that are essential in the field of conflict resolution (Ishiyama
& Batta, 2011; Péclard & Mechoulan, 2015; Berti, 2016).
The interactions between rebel groups and governments, and especially the study of the rebel
groups’ demands, are of particular interest. The rebels' credibility dilemma theory aims to better
understand these interactions and especially the nature of the demands according to the power of
the different rebel groups. This approach, already tested on specific geographical areas (Thomas
et al., 2016), is intended to constitute a more global theory about the behavior of rebel groups
within a game theory system.
While attempting to confirm the initial hypothesis of the rebels' credibility dilemma theory
through new research methodologies and procedures, we sought to develop a more complex
approach through further empirical and theoretical analysis. With the uptake of a relative power
indicator and multiple demand categorization scales, we sought to better understand the collected
data and derive results. This approach helped us to identify two new third-party actors to the
original dyad: the international community and the population. It also allowed us to suggest a new
model of the rebel credibility dilemma grounded in game theory.
The paper unfolds as follows: In the next section, we draw up a literary review of the subject
and issues related to the question of our study and the main challenges of this academic field. In
the following section, we list the different methodological phases starting with the general
theoretical framework, the complete description of the method and the methodological protocol,
while presenting our data. Finally, we present the empirical results obtained and theorize our
results in the form of a new model of the rebels’ credibility dilemma.

Literature Review
Our study is directly part of a recent research process, which has gained prominence in recent
years and opens a new area of study regarding the game theory of rebel-government negotiations
(Fearon, 2013). In this area of the negotiations between rebels and governments is a more specific
movement, namely the study of rebel behavior and about what these behaviors and actions can
explain, always being part of the game theory and the theoretical framework of international
relations, considering both groups as actors (Richardson, 1998).
The study of the factors that can lead to rebellion also offers a study of the behavior of
governments facing the threat and the specific political situation at the regional or national level,
allowing a real application today to the preservation of peace and conflict resolution in the world
(Arena & Hardt, 2014).
In this field of study, we rely at first glance on the work done by Thomas, Reed, and Wolford
(2016). The concept of a rebels' credibility dilemma is characterized by a theorized conjecture
observed in a regional study over a specific period of time. This concept theorizes that the more
objectively weak a rebel group is in comparison to the government, the more its own demands,
directly or indirectly submitted to the government, will fall within areas of government sovereignty
(Philpott, 1995), and this, in order to create some credibility in the relationship between itself and
the government (Maoz & Terris, 2006). Thus, the concept of the rebels' credibility dilemma is
anchored directly in a bilateral relationship between two defined actors maintaining a
relationship—even if it is conflictual—and interacting together in a game theory, where the main
issue here would be the credibility for the rebel group. Thus, the credibility of an actor in this
context can be defined as the extent to which each actor believes in the other one statements,
threats, or promises but also its ability to deliver a promised agreement (Maoz & Terris, 2006).
Starting from this fundamental notion, we first sought to demonstrate empirically the concept
by relying on a different geographical area and a longer period. This is to broadly support the way
in which we conduct this research, to take into account the specifics of the dilemma and the
enlargement of the data. Extending the time frame of our study makes it possible to place ourselves
in a more general movement of rebellions having taken place after 1945 and thus to better
characterize contemporary evolutions which are associated with this period (Gurr, 1993). The
focus on a new geographic area allows supporting the first study, but also to expand to a very
specific area by its characteristics inherent in the rebellion processes, while considering the fact
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that a globalized study is quite expensive in committed means and difficult to achieve at the risk
of implementing methodological biases by omitting the particularisms of the regions studied
(Wiarda, 2019).
However, certain limits to the initial concept appeared to us, which prompted us to develop a
new methodology, and enabled us to identify other factors and other essential actors, which are
not necessarily characteristic of the geographical area studied, but which seem to fall particularly
on the period studied—from 1945 to the present day—and the geographical area studied: Latin
America.
For that, it was essential to rely on another aspect of the scientific literature in order to complete
the rebels' credibility dilemma theory. On the one hand, it is the search for popular credibility and
all the works concerning the popular representation of governments and rebellion movements that
have helped us to better understand a fundamental aspect of the area and the temporality studied
(Bhavnani & Ross, 2003). On the other hand, it was also important to look at the international
perception of rebel groups and how they could be dealt with in order to better understand how
demands could be linked and play a role at the international level in the credibility sought by rebel
groups (Arjona et al., 2015).
The specificities of the area and the multiple issues studied also prompt us to consider global
work around transnational issues and particularly around the relationship between populations and
international bodies. The importance of non-state actors through populations and international
institutions holds a preponderant role in the work of Keck and Sikkink (1999), in particular as
regards globalized states. Our study is therefore positioned within these international networks
through the examination of special relations between governments and rebel groups, but also
around relations between rebel groups and populations, as well as relations between rebel groups
and international institutions, through these networks. In this, the study of the geographical area
that constitutes Latin America seemed perfectly adapted to shed light on certain important
mechanisms and thus present a new model of the rebels’ credibility dilemma.
We thus wish to corroborate not only the initial hypothesis of rebels' credibility dilemma, but
also through our results and our methodology, that of the existence of significant interconnections
between all these actors, seeking to influence each other around central challenges in a globalized
world, especially in Latin America due to the specificities of this area.
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Methodology
Theoretical Frame
It seems important to clarify the general theoretical framework in which our initial methodology
fits, to better understand how we built our own methodology to meet specific needs.
The first theoretical assumption in which we must inscribe is materialized in the fact that we
envisage that relations between rebel groups and governments can be described as relations
between two actors (Krasner, 1984) who each represent their wills and interests within the
demands expressed. These relations can lead to two solutions: a peace agreement (or at least a
ceasefire); or the beginning of a bellicose process between the two actors (Jenne et al., 2007).
This game between state and non-state actors is a game whose information seems to be
asymmetrical both on the side of rebel groups and on the side of governments (Butler & Gates,
2009). Thus, when one of the actors makes a demand—whether or not it is directly addressed to
the other actor—it is very difficult for the one to anticipate the reaction of the other actor. In
addition to the own and inherent composition of the two actors, we can identify two other types of
actors that influence the two actors of the dyad and that we highlight in the fourth section of our
study: the population and the international community (Philpott, 2001).
The study of this game as such is very interesting to describe, as did Thomas, Reed, and Wolford
(2016) in their work. As an initial baseline study, we decided to base ourselves on the conclusions
drawn by the authors in order to verify the hypotheses and conclusions of the theory, while
complementing the theory through the results obtained.
The rebel credibility dilemma, as theorized and analyzed in the initial reference work,
introduces the hypothesis of general credibility that would be of some importance to rebel groups.
Indeed, it seems that credibility, and more specifically the quest for credibility, can influence the
demands made and their importance when they are issued (Sobel, 1985). The initial theory also
posits the principle that rebels seem to make demands – no matter how large the demands are –
only when the rebel group is sufficiently optimistic about its chances of facing the government in
the event of a commitment to direct conflict. It is important to clarify the notion of credibility in
the sense of the original study to better understand the evolution that we are driving at within this
initial concept. Indeed, in their work, Thomas, Reed, and Wolford understand the concept of
credibility as an attractiveness of the continuation of the fighting from the point of view of rebel
groups in opposition to a threat to fight for governments if the demands of rebel groups are not
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met. We therefore wish to develop the notion of credibility within our theorization and model, in
order to limit it to the mere threat and attraction of combat (Gibbs, 2017). The rebels’ credibility
dilemma is a dilemma in the sense that the rebels seek to give weight to their action and therefore
indirectly to gain recognition as a specific actor (Huang, 2016). The dilemma therefore arises
through the initial hypothesis put forward. To gain credibility in general, a rebel group will be
tempted to make more important demands than what it is theoretically capable of asking in a
negotiation process with regard to its power, in order to appear, through its demands, more credible
and therefore stronger. The dilemma therefore stands out with the hypothesis of an illusion of
power through the idea that a weaker rebel group will make greater demands.
All of this seems to contrast the initial theoretical choice of considering both governments and
rebel groups as actors, which would seem rational (Moore, 1995). As a result, it would also appear
that the likelihood of rebel groups making at least a request for government sovereignty—which
is, likely to alter state sovereignty in any way (Thomson, 1995)—would increase in proportion to
the importance of the military capabilities of rebel groups.
The anchor point of our study lies in the latest theoretical and empirical result presented, namely
the fact that strong and weak rebel groups are both more likely to make strong demands relative to
government sovereignty than rebel groups with average general power.
This predominant explanation lies at the very heart of the rebels' credibility dilemma. This
initial empirical and theoretical evidence is justified by the fact that weak groups would be looking
for credibility and would issue extremely important demands in order to gain credibility. When
rebel groups become more powerful, the question of credibility seems to deviate from their main
objectives and demands made should be more moderate. Then finally, when the groups are
sufficiently powerful, the importance of the demands would be explained by the fact that the
question of credibility is completely discarded and that the demands carried out – even important
– come more from a will to realize (Bénabou & Tirole, 2004). Thus, the notion of credibility, in
our work, must be understood as the need to be taken seriously by the authorities and therefore to
be heard as a fully-fledged and high-level actor in the negotiation processes, not just as a threat or
an attraction to engage in or continue fighting (Azad, 2019).
Just as it is important to anchor the notion of credibility in the general framework of
international relations and more particularly in peace studies, it is important to define the concept
of power and in particular the introduction that we have decided to make of the concept of relative
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power, out of step with the initial study of the rebels’ credibility dilemma. The notion of power of
rebel groups is quite difficult to estimate and its comparative measurement is something delicate
(Krause, 2017). If the study from which we decided to start our research measures the power of
the rebel groups through absolute real capacities only, we decided to couple with these last data
another relative factor that we decided to attach to the national framework of each movement. If
this choice seems rather delicate and carries a methodological bias, it seems that specifically in
relation to the geographical space studied, this relative focus in relation to the states is justified, in
particular regarding the organization and the national presence of rebel groups. In addition, this
relative indicator allows us to rule out another methodological bias of comparison with framing on
the relationship between governments and rebels, knowing that each state does not have the same
means vis-à-vis rebel groups (Aronson & Huth, 2017).
Methods
First, it seems essential to better understand how we selected the rebel groups and all the data
about them that were useful in our study. Using the non-state actors in civil wars database
(Cunningham et al., 2013) and supplementing them extensively with existing historical studies,
national archives from countries of the area and press releases, we have established a list of 48
rebel groups over a period from 1945 to 2019. Our main selection criterion is conceptual and
temporal to minimal. Indeed, we chose to select the rebel groups that had a duration of action of
more than one month, in order to avoid relationships that were too short and left few negotiations,
as can be the case in a coup d'état. In addition, our definition of a rebel group is characterized by
its opposition to a government or to a conventional regional authority, as may be the case
sometimes (Fjelde & Nilsson, 2012).
One of our main notions in the initial hypothesis refers directly to the notion of rebel group
power. It therefore seemed essential to better introduce this concept which must be palpable and
quantifiable to compare the different groups with each other through their claims and their relative
power. However, this concept of power requires relative implementation vis-à-vis the governments
and countries in which they are, knowing that we first study behaviors within a relationship in the
form of a complex dyad. For that, we extracted important variables built on the existing work of
the non-state actors in civil wars database (Cunningham et al., 2013), in order to group together
the most significant and important variables in the context of establishing a measure, in the form
of relative power Ρ(r).
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With these variables we came to form a relative power indicator Ρ(r) {Ρ(r) ∈ ℝ, 0,4 ≤ Ρ(r) < 1}
𝑛

Ρ(r) = ∑(
𝑖=1

𝑛(𝑟)
∙ 103 ) + 𝜌(𝑟) + 𝛾(𝑟) + 𝛼(𝑟) + 𝜑(𝑟)
𝑝(𝑛)

where 𝑛(𝑟) is the estimate number of rebel group members. The value 𝑝(𝑛) corresponds to the
total population of the country where the rebel group is acting in relative value to the period of the
rebel group activity. The variable 𝜌(𝑟) corresponds to the general estimate rebel group's strength
against the government of which it composes the dyad (three possible values: much weaker = 0.1 ;
weaker = 0.2 ; moderate = 0.3). The variables 𝛾(𝑟), 𝛼(𝑟) and 𝜑(𝑟) respectively correspond to the
mobilization capacity, the arming capacity and the combat capacity of the rebel groups relatively
to their respective dyads (three possible values for each variable: very low = 0.1 ; low = 0.15 ;
moderate = 0.2).
Thus, we have a tool for measuring the relative power Ρ(r) of each rebel group, which helps us
to better match the entire list of demands specific to each rebel group. The measure of the relative
power that we propose through the indicator P(r) differs quite broadly from the single measure of
the real absolute capacities of the rebel groups in that it absorbs the capacities by nuancing the
latter in the face of the different governments making up the dyad. This measure has certain limits,
in particular with regard to its possible transposition into other geographical areas. Indeed, there
is the possibility of bias through potential identification and the possibility of problems inferential
to the use of a relative measure of power (Keith, 2019). However, we believe that with regard to
the area studied, such a consideration of the relative power is necessary in order to avoid a
comparison bias, as we have advanced in the theoretical framework.
In this way, our methodological protocol is based on the notion of power and its comparison
with the demands of each rebel group for which we have created categorization scales to better
treat the data retrieved through the various sources cited.
Scales of Categorization of Demands
In order to test the general hypothesis of the rebel credibility dilemma theory, it is important to
return to the initial categorization (Thomas et al., 2016). This first categorization takes in our study
the name of Scale No. 1, considered as our first base of analysis to offer a first reading of the
recovered data and especially to verify for the case of Latin America, the results obtained on the
African area. This Scale No. 1 allows us to classify the various claims and demands of rebel groups
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around their degree of threat on the sovereignty of the dyad governments. G groups demands that
could undermine the sovereignty of the government in place directly or indirectly and NG groups
demands that cannot undermine the sovereignty of the government in place. We consider that a
demand that undermines the sovereignty of government is a demand that questions the institutional
and ideological organization of the government, as defined by Stewart (2018). This classification
allows us to test the initial hypothesis of Thomas, Reed, and Wolford's work on the rebels’
credibility dilemma. This first scale can be called scale of importance of demands.
The other two scales that we have undertaken to formalize are based on observations of the data
that we have collected, but also on a process of classification by type of requests in order to better
understand the nature of the demands and especially how demands can be part of a search for
credibility not only with the government making up the dyad, but also with populations and
international community.
Scale No. 2 proposes a primary classification to our approach in order to create three blocks to
generically classify our data by areas of interest to which the demands of the rebels refer. P groups
all the requests related to the field of politics, including the whole domain in the scientific meaning
(Palonen, 2003). E groups all the requests related directly or indirectly to the field of the economy.
Finally, S groups all social and societal issues outside the political and economic spheres. This
scale is representative of the areas of the expression of demands that can be made by rebel groups.
Scale No. 3 is intended as a tool for more accurate analysis of the demands of rebel groups,
through an axis centred around themes rather than domains. This last scale of analysis includes 18
themes that we have established according to their relevance to the data exploited and the empirical
needs of our research. The purpose of this classification is not only to adapt to the data, to present
the data and to serve as the basis for further demand and claim analysis studies. These themes
therefore cover all of the data recovered and make it possible to classify each of the requests made
in one of the categories of this classification scale. ED groups demands about education in general,
from literacy to university applications. PH brings together demands about public health, from
campaigning against endemic diseases to creating social security. IR brings together demands
about international relations, from stopping some diplomatic relations of the government of the
dyad to the withdrawal of foreign troops on national ground. W groups demands about work and
working conditions, from the reduction of weekly working hours to the introduction of policies
about unemployment. SV groups demands about state violence, from the government's cessation
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of torture to the repeal of state of emergency laws. I groups demands about purely ideological
claims, from the establishment of a political ideology to religious ideology. SM groups demands
about social misery, from increased purchasing power to famine. ECO groups demands relating to
ecology in general, from global environmental protection to the implementation of new
autonomous energy policies. APP groups demands about the abuse of political power, from
stopping electoral fraud to stopping corruption. RG groups demands directly related to rebel
groups, from the release of political prisoners to the conclusion of a ceasefire. EM groups demands
about ethnic, cultural, political or social minorities, from the creation of an autonomous region to
the preservation of indigenous rights. M groups demands about moral questions, from the adoption
of a state religion to the prohibition of marital infidelity. NES groups demands about the national
economic system, from nationalization of companies to state economic planning. T groups
demands about taxation in general, from lower taxes to a VAT application only for luxury goods.
Y groups demands for youth, from the extension of voting rights from 18 years old to the
construction of orphanages. SSI groups demands about state structures and institutions, from the
end of the current regime to the modernization of state institutions. GF groups demands about
general freedoms, whether individual or collective, from the right to demonstrate to the liberation
of women. Finally, TA groups demands for technological advances, from the development of a
technological industry to the modernization of agricultural production.
This last scale seems to be the most important in the final scope of our study. Indeed, it allows
us to compartmentalize the different demands and to extract essential components in our
methodological protocol through our basic data. This Scale No. 3 may be called the thematic scale
of the claims.
Methodological Protocol and Basic Data
Our study is therefore based on data we collected from a large sample of rebel groups in Latin
America from 1945 to 2019.
This choice is justified by the quantitative importance of the data in this geographical area and
for this given period, which will allow us to avoid a quantitative bias. In addition, the area studied
seemed particularly conducive to the study of the rebels’ credibility dilemma, in order to offer a
comparison with the African study already carried out, especially since the extended period that
we have chosen corresponds to a new area of claims, battles, and rebellions in Latin America
(Flores & Rosaldo, 2009). The choice of the extension until 2019 allows to include new rebel
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groups and especially the most recent requests of the rebel groups still in activity. It also allows us
to partially eliminate the geographic and temporal bias with the importance of Marxist groups, and
to include a number of indigenous rebel groups, more numerous since the start of the 21st century
(Cleary, 2000). Our analysis sample includes 48 rebel groups (Table 1) in 19 Latin American
countries1, with a total of 828 requests. This distribution allows us to have a wide range of rebel
groups facing various governments depending on the periods of activity.
The heterogeneity of our data is characterized by the values of the different relative powers
Ρ(r), ranging from 0.4016 to 0.9958, as well as in the great diversity of demands made by rebel
groups during their existence.
It should also be noted that the total quantity of demands issued by each rebel group differs, but
however, the distribution as a function of the relative power is fairly homogeneous, which avoids
this methodological bias of first order.
Our methodological protocol is based initially on the objective study of each rebel group of our
sample as well as the government to which it is opposed, in order to extract the essential data to
calculate the relative power Ρ(r). To do this, it was necessary to build on the work already done on
non-state actors in civil conflicts (Cunningham et al., 2013), while providing sufficient material
and research through a thorough study of relations between rebel groups and governments, thanks
in particular to the historical sources and the national archives of the various states.
On the other hand, it was necessary to conduct a background study on all the demands made by
the rebel groups in our sample on their period of activity as a rebel group opposed to a government.
This research was carried out through various press releases and manifestos issued by rebel groups
to governments, as well as to the people and the international community. In addition, we also
studied the various archives available and declassified in order to take into account the demands

1

Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guadeloupe (France),

Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Suriane & Uruguay.
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Table 1
List of studied rebel groups
Ação Libertadora Nacional (BR)

Alliance révolutionnaire caraïbe (FR)

Comandos Ernesto Rojas (CO)

Comision Nestor Paz Zamora (BO)

Ejército de Liberación Nacional (CO)

Ejército de Liberación Nacional de Bolivia
(BO)

Ejército del Pueblo Paraguayo (PY)

Ejército Guerrillero de los Pobres (GT)

Ejército Guerrillero Túpac Katari (BO)

Ejército Popular de Liberación (CO)

Ejército Popular Revolucionario (MX)

Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo (AR)

Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo (SV)

Ejército Revolucionario Guevarista (CO)

Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional
(MX)

Frente Nacionalista Patria y Libertad (CL)

Frente Patriótico Manuel Rodríguez (CL)

Frente Patriótico Morazanista (HN)

Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional

Frente Unido de Liberación Nacional (PY)

Front pour la libération et la reconstruction

(NI)
Fuerzas Armadas Peronistas (AR)

nationales (HT)
Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes (GT)

Fuerzas

Armadas

Revolucionarias

de

Colombia (CO)
Grupo Popular Guerrillero (MX)

Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias Indígenas

Fuerzas Populares de Liberación "Farabundo

del Pacífico (CO)

Martí" (SV)

Grupos de Combatientes Populares (EC)

Jungle Commando (SR)

Montoneros (AR)

Movimento Revolucionário Oito de Outubro

Movimiento 19 de Abril (CO)

Movimiento 26 de Julio (CU)

Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria

Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria

(CL)

(PE)

Movimiento Nacionalista Tacuara (AR)

Movimiento Revolucionario 13 Noviembre

(BR)
Movimiento Armado Quintin Lame (CO)

Movimiento Juvenil Lautaro (CL)

(GT)
Movimiento Revolucionario 14 de Junio

Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Amaru

Organización Revolucionario del Pueblo en

(DO)

(PE)

Armas (GT)

Partido de los Pobres (MX)

Resistencia Ancestral Mapuche (AR)

Resistencia Nacional (SV)

Sendero Luminoso (PE)

Tupamaros (UY)

Vanguarda Armada Revolucionária Palmares
(BR)

that could be emitted during negotiations between rebel group and government. Thus, we consulted
all the national archives of the countries concerned in order to recover the documents of
negotiations, declassified analyses, the manifestos and the declarations—often public—of the
rebel groups, in order to recover all the demands and claims. Thereafter, we categorized each
request according to the three categorization scales to obtain the data that we present in this study.
It seems that some documents are not completely declassified, and we have not been able to
recover all the documents from certain countries. However, this characteristic does not necessarily
11

induce a bias in our data since the rebel groups in Latin America seem to be extremely
communicative regarding their demands and claims, especially for the rebel groups closest in time
(Cortina Orero, 2018).
Once these data were collected, we tried to transcribe the various classification scales that we
theorized previously to establish a better readability of the raw data.
Finally, our study focused on the verification of initial hypotheses, through a similar but
differentiated methodology, and the release of further results towards the formalization of a new
theory of the rebels’ credibility dilemma.
The use of simple linear regression seems to be the best way to test the stated hypotheses in a
clear and specific manner and thus obtain results according to the intensity of the requests and the
P(r) indicator. The use of multiple linear regression through the different constituent indices of
P(r) does not provide more information and does not allow us to take into account the relativity of
the power of the rebel groups according to governments making up the dyad.
Results and Critical Review
The Search for Basic Credibility
When we try to get a better understanding of the distribution of requests, we realize that, in
general, G demands represent only a small part of the total claims, accounting for 18.63% of total
demands. This small proportion seems to be general and is not limited to P(r). That is to say that
in general, rebel groups make fewer G-type demands. However, in order to better characterize the
general distribution of these demands, according to the relative power of the rebel groups, it is
essential to compare these different parts of G and NG demands with our relative power indicator
Ρ(r) (Fig. 1).
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Figure 1
G demands in relation to the power P(r)
1.2

G demands in relation to the power Ρ(r)

Relative power P (r)
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y = -7.03E-01x + 8.20E-01
R² = 3.06E-01
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Parts of G demands
The results of our study seem to show quite distinctly that there is an important relationship
between the relative power P(r) of rebel groups and the demands of rebel groups in a dyad
relationship with governments over the time and space geographically studied. Thus, in a global
manner, rebel groups would tend to issue a higher number of G demands when their relative power
against a government would be too weak, with the primary aim of finding credibility in the
negotiation process. This quest for credibility with governments and through G demands seems to
be lost as rebel groups gain relative power P(r) in relation to the power of governments. This trend
can be seen in a small part of G demands or rather an exclusivity of NG demands.
Contrary to the initial observation of the theory of the rebels' credibility dilemma, our sample
shows that groups with the highest relative power emit very few G demands. However, the general
trend initially proposed seems to be verified through our sample and this allows us to characterize,
in certain proportions, the behavior of rebel groups and their search for initial credibility, as we
defined it.
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These results of our sample do not seem to be influenced by the different possible outcomes of
the conflicts when they are over. Similarly, there seems to be no prior relationship between these
results and the types of ideology of rebel groups and those of different governments. There also
seems to be no geographical trend, which allows us to see a global phenomenon throughout the
region, or by extension to all rebel groups, but it is impossible to broadly extend these results
empirically for all rebel groups. The difficulty of a global analysis raises the question of the
importance of regional particularities in our analysis. Indeed, regarding our sample, it seems that
the initial trend is verified, but we cannot extend these results without global data concerning the
demands of rebel groups.
It is possible to discuss this first advanced result, in particular on the effects of this relationship,
in order to know if the search for credibility is at the heart of the demands of rebel groups. We can
also discuss the reliability of the indicator P(r) which not only categorizes the groups according to
absolute real capacities, invariably making them fit into boxes which sometimes are not
sufficiently revealing of the rebel groups’ power, but also the more we can question the importance
of the relativity of this measure. Indeed, the relativity of power has been measured through the
relationship between rebel groups and governments. Regarding the area studied, the majority of
rebel groups acted and placed themselves within a national framework and therefore could be
compared to national governments. However, transnational or local rebel groups located in substate bodies therefore form an important methodological bias which should be taken into account
in other geographical or temporal areas (Arslan, 2018). In addition, the low share of G demands
allows us to question the reality and the tangibility of these requests within the negotiation process,
even if the trend seems confirmed on the studied sample.
Beyond the explanation we offer through the theory of the rebels' credibility and the importance
of this credibility, other works allow us to put these results in perspective through a doubleexplanatory mechanism. Indeed, the demands of rebel groups tend to be a lever for negotiation
with government authorities and the perception of power is a primary issue for rebel groups (Jenne
et al., 2007). However, it would seem that the perception of power pushes rebel groups, in an
opposite logic, to make more extreme demands (Ayres, 2000), and that these demands are notably
motivated by brutal changes in negotiation situations (Toft, 2006).
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Thus, during our research, we found that other factors and relationships were consistent with
the search for other credibilities, and that it did not focus solely on a search for a general credibility,
or rather a unique credibility with governments.
International and Popular Credibility
The addition to the classification Scale No. 3 of the demands of a group indexing the IR
demands about international relations allowed us to draw a rather interesting trend concerning the
search for credibility of the rebel groups (Fig. 2).
A relation therefore seems to be established between the relative power P(r) and the part of IR
demands. This tendency is observed in the sense that the more a rebel group has a relative power
P(r), the more it seems to be inclined to perform at least one IR demand. However, we note that in
general, the place of IR demands is not preponderant despite the fact that the trend seems quite
clear. This small proportion can be interpreted as marking the fact that for the area studied, the
preponderance of the state and societal framework does not offer a sufficiently important place to
international bodies over the period given (Legler, 2013).
These results pave the way for a further degree of analysis in understanding the phenomenon
of the rebels' search for credibility. Indeed, we are now able to consider the search for international
credibility as an additional phase of credibility research with a third party to the original dyad
between rebel group and government. This third actor which can be interpreted as the whole of the
international scene, is particularly noticeable in the content of IR demands, and in the importance
of these demands for rebel groups with an important relative power P(r).
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Figure 2
IR demands in relation to the power P(r)
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The vision of a new phase is indicative of a search for credibility completed, facing a new
dimension of the search for credibility for larger rebel groups.
However, the results seem to show that the search for international credibility is not a constant
depending on the power of the rebel groups, prompting us to recognize that there is a search for
significant international credibility on the part of the rebel groups, but that this is not necessarily
proportional to its relative power. We find the importance of this international dimension of rebel
groups in numerous works, and our results further highlight the importance of this international
dimension (Harbom & Wallensteen, 2005). Putting this search for credibility into perspective leads
us to think that, given the data on the area studied, the rebel groups are increasingly seeking to
gain credibility and recognition from the international community, which has become a central
actor, nowadays, in negotiations and peacekeeping processes in particular (Jo, 2015).
Alongside this third actor, is another actor outside of the original dyad. Indeed, it seems that
there is a search for popular credibility through important social, economic, and political demands
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in favor of the populations. To better understand this, we sought to gather its various demands
through the Scale No. 3 categorization of demands, gathering ED, PH, W, SV, SM, ECO, APP,
EM, T, Y, GF demands (Fig. 3). The grouping of these categories is interpreted as an attempt to
mobilize popular demands, which can be shared with a large segment of the population, or more
generally which are established for the populations to improve their conditions in particular. We
thus find there the requests relating to education; public health; working conditions; state violence;
social misery; ecology; potential abuse of political power; minorities ethnic; taxes; youth; and
general freedoms.
The results seem to show that there is no relationship between the relative power P(r) and the
popular demands, which suggests that the search for popular credibility would be permanent or
steady for all rebel groups.
These results allow us to further broaden the spectrum of analysis that is the theory of the rebels'
credibility dilemma and to better understand the mechanisms of reflection and action in terms of
game theory in this kind of conflict situation. However, the results presented are open to discussion
and it would seem that this precise study on a geographical area such as Latin America may have
some biases. These biases could appear, first of all, through the representation of Marxistcommunist ideology as a prominent sub-category of rebel group in the area and the studied
duration (67% of the sample). Similarly, it is possible to discuss the different types of conflicts,
including conflicts that have benefited from external assistance, both for rebel groups and for
governments, and the impacts of such external assistance on demands, relative power of rebel
groups, and ultimately their search for credibility.
Nevertheless, the whole point of research in the field now lies in taking into account these two
third-party actors, namely the international community and the populations, in order to better
understand the influences of these actors on the search for credibility of rebel groups.
This accounting of the third-party actors has already taken place through various research works
on transnationalism (Keck & Sikkink, 1998). However, all the contributions of the results that we
have just provided is to consider these aspects through the search for credibility of rebel groups in
order to better understand their behavioral logic.
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Figure 3
Popular demands in relation to the power P(r)
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The results that we advance here are operable with regard to the temporal period and the
geographic space of Latin America and therefore the specificities of this space as much as of the
period studied. However, a series of historical, political, and social studies would make it possible
to confirm, refute or corroborate all of these results, over different periods and spaces, but also by
implementing different methodologies and data.
In addition, the mechanisms and dynamics of these interactions and these relations of influence
seem more than interesting for in-depth study, in particular from a psychological point of view
through the didactic logic of the psychosociological study of conflicts and multiple negotiations.
We can also discuss the use of scales, whose completeness seems full for the area studied, but
which might not be for other areas and other temporality. In addition, despite the definitions we
have given, it seems that certain requests are at the borders of several categories, which also poses
a problem in the methodology as we have established it.
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Modelling the Credibility Dilemma with Four Actors
The results that we obtained thanks to our sample allow us to set up a new model of the dilemma.
We were able to confirm, on our sample, that the hypotheses of the dilemma had an influence on
the relations of the initial dyad, through demands made by the rebel groups. In addition, we have
extracted demands relating to international issues and societal issues by assuming that they did not
only have their source in the relations of the dyad.
Thus, we left the dyad to consider the demands of the rebel groups as directed not only towards
the government, but also towards the international community and towards the people.
From these basic hypotheses, we have developed a model of the rebels’ credibility dilemma
with four actors, trying to understand through theoretical and empirical hypotheses the objectives
of these demands as a function of the relative power of the rebel groups (Fig. 4).
Our general model of the rebels’ credibility dilemma assumes that all rebel groups – regardless
of relative power – issue popular demands to the people. We also assume that the more powerful
a rebel group is, compared to a government, the more international demands it will make to the
international community, and the weaker a rebel group is, compared to a government, the more it
will make demands that jeopardize the sovereignty of the government.
The search for popular credibility of the rebel groups seems to be an objective at all times,
knowing that the vast majority of the rebel groups studied claim to be part of the people, their
sufferings, and their problems (Eck, 2014). This search for credibility seems to have the ultimate
objective of obtaining not only moral and ideological support from the people, but also their
material support in the event that fighting can take place (Wood, 2013). This search for support
does not seem to be characterized by the power of rebel groups and, on the contrary, seems to be
central in the negotiation process, especially in the public communication of requests (Larson &
Lewis, 2018).
The search for credibility with governments through strong and important demands affecting
the sovereignty of these governments is an important issue for rebel groups seeking to assert
themselves and to give credibility to claims that are more important to them (Buhaug, 2006). Our
explanatory hypotheses relate to the fact that the rebel groups seek to appear more important and
powerful than they really are when there is a need for them to do so, for example to have certain
requests accepted or to make an act of presence and pressure (Jetten & Hornsey, 2011).
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Figure 4
The credibility dilemma model

Finally, the search for international credibility is an objective that we could classify as
secondary or even tertiary in the objectives of the rebel groups through their requests. In fact, these
requests come after popular and governmental requests, and constitute a search for credibility that
we could qualify as final credibility, through international institutions. This research manifests
itself notably through international standards and international dialogue, giving an echo to the rebel
group through its credibility (Mueller, 2014). In addition, rebel groups may be willing to find a
third player in the international community who could act as a mediator in relations between the
rebels and the government (Duursma, 2014). Finally, the whole dynamic of transnational
rebellions seems to carry a very interesting example which allows us to get out of the simple
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relationship of dyads and to undertake the international community as a primordial stake of the
initial dilemma through the demands of rebel groups (Salehyan, 2007).
Conclusion
Thus, we presented a new approach to the theory of the rebels' credibility dilemma. Thanks to
the use of new data on a geographical area and a specific period, we sought to confirm the already
existing results in the discipline. We have also introduced two new concepts to the theory of the
rebels' credibility dilemma by conceptualizing two new actors to whom rebel groups are seeking
credibility: the international community and the people.
We have shown that weaker rebel groups tend to make larger demands for the purpose of
seeking credibility. We have distinguished this search for credibility by specifying it as intended
for governments. We have shown that the strongest rebel groups tend to make more demands on
international affairs in order to seek credibility with the international community. We have shown
that all rebel groups seem to make a number of popular demands in order to gain credibility with
the population. Finally, we have conceptualized through our hypothesis, a new model of rebels’
credibility dilemma with four actors.
The confirmation of all these results must involve studies on other geographical areas and other
time periods. It would be interesting to seek a better understanding of the relations between the
rebel groups and these new actors, as well as the relations between the governments and these new
actors in the context of the dyadic relationship with the rebel groups. It would also be interesting
to study more specifically the search for credibility among the populations in order to better
understand the importance of this search for credibility for geographical areas other than Latin
America.
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